Confidential Enquiries · Institutional Counterparties Only
Use Case For Founders & Executive Officers Concentrated Equity

Founder Stock Loans.

Liquidity against locked-up, insider-restricted, or concentrated founder equity — without selling, without breaching the lock-up, and with disclosure structured per the relevant market.

01 · The Founder Problem
Paper-Rich, Cash-Constrained

A position that cannot be sold.

A founder emerges from an IPO holding the largest concentrated position of their professional life — and is, very often, in the worst position to do anything with it. Lock-up agreements restrict sales for six to twelve months. Insider-trading rules restrict sales for as much again. Substantial-holding disclosure rules turn every transaction into a public event. The position is real; the liquidity is not.

The same arithmetic applies to executive officers receiving large equity grants, to founders of post-merger entities holding earn-out stock, and to controlling shareholders who have inherited substantial positions through succession. The position is the wealth; selling the position dismantles the wealth.

An institutional stock loan against the position addresses the arithmetic directly. The shares are pledged as collateral. A defined percentage of their market value is advanced as cash. The lock-up is not breached because no sale occurs. The disclosure footprint is, in most markets, materially smaller than that of a sale. The position is recovered in full on repayment.

02 · How It’s Structured
For Founders Specifically

The five variables that change for founder positions.

  • i
    Loan-to-value. LTV for founder positions is calibrated to the single-stock liquidity of the underlying. A large-cap on a top-tier exchange — NYSE, Nasdaq, LSE Main Market, TSE Prime — supports a higher LTV than a recently-listed growth issuer with thin float. Indicative ratios are issued only after position review.
  • ii
    Lock-up compatibility. A pledge of shares is not, in most jurisdictions, a transfer for the purposes of standard underwriter lock-up agreements. The lock-up is read carefully at the structuring stage. Where the lock-up restricts pledges, the structure is timed accordingly — either after expiry or with explicit underwriter consent.
  • iii
    Insider-trading rules. The pledge is documented at a time when the founder is not in possession of material non-public information. In US markets, structures are often pre-cleared through the issuer’s compliance function and timed against the open trading window. A 10b5-1-style plan is not typically applicable because no sale occurs, but the spirit of the rule is observed.
  • iv
    Disclosure footprint. The pledge of shares by a director or substantial shareholder is, in most major markets, a disclosable event. The disclosure is shorter and less market-moving than a sale disclosure, but it is real. Timing, sequencing, and language are managed at the documentation stage.
  • v
    Voting and dividend flow. Voting rights typically remain with the founder for the duration of the loan. Dividends are routed per the documentation — typically retained by the founder, subject to structuring. Corporate actions (rights issues, splits, takeovers) are addressed expressly.
03 · Jurisdictional Notes
By Market

What changes when the listing is different.

The structural mechanics of a founder stock loan are constant; the regulatory overlays are not. The principal market-specific considerations:

  • ·
    United States (NYSE, Nasdaq). Schedule 13D/13G beneficial-ownership disclosure applies under the Exchange Act. Section 16 reporting applies to insiders. Form 144 applies to sales but not to pledges. Underwriter lock-ups typically run 180 days and are negotiable on a case basis.
  • ·
    United Kingdom (LSE). FCA DTR 5 voting-rights notifications apply with step disclosures — materially more granular than US standards. The Premium Listing standard adds further pledge-related disclosure obligations for directors and substantial holders.
  • ·
    Hong Kong (HKEX). SFO Part XV Disclosure of Interests applies with granular step disclosures. Connected-party rules under the HKEX Listing Rules add a further layer for controlling shareholders and directors.
  • ·
    Germany (Deutsche Börse) and other EU markets. WpHG voting-rights notifications apply with step thresholds cascading through the EU Transparency Directive framework. Disclosure is materially more granular than US standards.
  • ·
    Japan (TSE). Large-Shareholding Report (FIEA) applies with step disclosures. Cross-shareholding tradition affects the structuring of large founder positions.

A specific founder position to discuss?

Submit a confidential enquiry. A senior principal will respond within one business day.

05 · FAQ
Common Questions

What people most often ask first.

Q · 01 Does pledging shares as collateral breach a standard IPO lock-up agreement?
In most standard underwriter lock-up agreements, a pledge is distinguished from a sale and is permitted, subject to specific carve-outs. The lock-up is read carefully at the structuring stage. Where the lock-up restricts pledges, the transaction is timed either to post-expiry or to underwriter consent.
Q · 02 Do I lose voting rights on my pledged shares during the loan?
Voting rights typically remain with the borrower for the duration of the loan. The specific terms are documented at the outset; arrangements vary by jurisdiction and structure. In bankruptcy-remote custody arrangements, the custodian holds legal title but the beneficial owner retains voting authority.
Q · 03 How does this differ from a margin loan offered by my broker?
Institutional stock loans are bespoke structures with negotiated LTV, tenor, recourse profile, and custody arrangements. Margin loans are standardised credit facilities that typically carry tighter margin calls, shorter effective tenor, and full recourse to the borrower. For substantial founder positions, the institutional structure is materially more appropriate.
Q · 04 Will my shareholders know I have pledged my founder stake?
In most major markets, the pledge of shares by a director or substantial shareholder is a disclosable event under the relevant beneficial-ownership regime. The disclosure is materially shorter and less market-moving than a sale disclosure, but it is real. The specific filing, threshold, timing, and language is structured per market at the documentation stage.