Insights ~7 minute read

IPO Lock-Up Periods Across the US, EU and APAC: Post-IPO Founder Bridges.

IPO lock-up periods, which bar insiders from selling after listing, are contractual in the US and Europe: around 180 days in the US, commonly 180 to 360 days in Europe. In Asia-Pacific, Hong Kong and India impose lock-ups by rule and release them in stages. A founder bridge loan is timed to run past the last binding release.

A sculptural spiral staircase rising through a concrete atrium toward an oval skylight

Every founder who takes a company public meets the same problem once the shares are listed. They hold substantial paper wealth and have a genuine need for capital, but face a contractual or regulatory bar on selling for a defined period. The instrument that bridges that gap is a securities-backed loan against the locked-up position.

A pledge is not a sale, and the constraints that prevent selling do not always prevent borrowing.

What determines the shape of that bridge, more than anything else, is the lock-up regime of the listing venue. That regime sets how long the window runs, whether it releases in one step or several, and whether it is a private contract or a rule of the exchange.

This is a general explanation of how those regimes differ and how they shape bridge timing, not legal or investment advice. The specific lock-up terms are always a matter for the holder’s own counsel.

The threshold question is whether a given lock-up permits a pledge at all, and it is treated separately in Can You Borrow Against Restricted or Lock-Up Shares? The subject here is the next question. Given that a pledge is permitted, how does the regime’s release calendar dictate the tenor, the staging, and the recourse profile of the bridge?

How long is the IPO lock-up period in the United States?

A US IPO lock-up customarily runs around one hundred and eighty days from pricing, in a single contractual step. There is no statutory IPO lock-up in the United States. The lock-up is a private contract between the insiders and the underwriters, and it restricts sales and transfers, not necessarily pledges.

Separately, the resale of restricted and affiliate securities is governed by Rule 144. It continues to constrain how insiders sell into the market after the contractual lock-up lifts. The result is a relatively clean two-part calendar: a single contractual cliff at roughly six months, after which sales become possible under the volume, manner-of-sale, and notice conditions for affiliates.

For bridge timing, the US pattern is the most straightforward. The founder’s need for capital typically arises inside the lock-up, so the bridge is structured to run past the one hundred and eighty-day cliff. The founder then reaches the release window with the loan in place and a genuine choice about whether to sell, refinance, or hold.

Because the release is a single step, the tenor is set against a single date, with headroom, rather than a staggered schedule.

How long are IPO lock-up periods in Europe?

European IPO lock-ups commonly run in the one hundred and eighty-day to three hundred and sixty-day range. They are often longer for the founders and controlling shareholders of a newly-listed company than for financial investors. Europe, too, has no single harmonised statutory lock-up.

On the London market, on Euronext, on the German exchanges, and across the other European venues, the lock-up is a contractual undertaking negotiated with the underwriters.

What Europe adds is disclosure. For listings in the EU, the Prospectus Regulation has the material lock-up arrangements set out in the prospectus, so the release calendar is on public record from the first day of trading.

The financing consequence is that European lock-ups are frequently longer and more differentiated than the US norm. A founder may be locked for a year while early investors are free at six months.

That tiering matters for a bridge, because it changes both when the founder’s own position releases and how the market’s float deepens as other tranches come free. The bridge is timed to the founder’s own release, but the calibration takes account of the liquidity that arrives as the earlier tranches unlock.

How do IPO lock-ups work in Asia-Pacific?

Asia-Pacific is where the analysis changes character. Several of the principal regimes impose mandatory lock-ups by rule rather than leaving the matter to the underwriters, and several stagger the release across more than one date.

In Hong Kong, the HKEX Listing Rules require a controlling shareholder to be locked up for at least the first six months after listing. For a further six months, the shareholder remains restricted to the extent a disposal would cause them to cease to be a controlling shareholder. The effect is a two-stage, up-to-twelve-month calendar for a control holder.

In India, the SEBI Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements (ICDR) Regulations impose a promoter lock-in that is expressly staggered. Under those rules, as reformed in recent years, the minimum promoter contribution stays locked in longer than the promoters’ holding above that minimum, which releases earlier.

In mainland China, controlling shareholders of a company listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange are subject to long statutory lock-ups. These are substantially longer than the developed-market norm. In Japan, the Tokyo market’s lock-ups are, as in the US and Europe, principally contractual undertakings to the underwriters.

The staggering is the point. Where a regime releases the position in tranches (a first slice at six months, a larger block later), a single-date bridge is the wrong instrument. Instead, the financing is structured against the staged calendar.

Its tenor spans the last binding release, with the option to reduce the loan as each tranche comes free. At each release, the founder chooses whether to sell into it or continue to hold. The regime supplies the calendar, and the bridge is built around it.

How does the lock-up regime shape a founder bridge loan?

Reduced to its structural inputs, the lock-up regime drives three decisions in a post-IPO bridge:

  • i
    Tenor. The loan is sized to run past the last binding release window, with headroom, so the founder is never forced to sell into the expiry. A single-cliff US lock-up sets one date; a staggered Indian promoter lock-in or a two-stage Hong Kong control lock-up sets several, and the tenor spans the last of them.
  • ii
    Recourse. For a founder whose wealth is concentrated in a freshly-listed, often volatile position, the recourse profile bounds the downside through the lock-up. That is the period when the shares cannot be sold to cover a shortfall. A non-recourse or limited-recourse structure is frequently the right choice (see how recourse profiles compare).
  • iii
    Disclosure. The pledge by a substantial holder or promoter is, in most of these markets, a disclosable event, and its timing is read against the release calendar and any blackout windows. Mandatory-lock-up regimes such as Hong Kong and India watch promoter and controlling-shareholder encumbrance especially closely, so the disclosure is mapped, not improvised.

What does a bridge loan change during a lock-up?

The recurring theme across all three regions is timing, not pressure: a bridge separates the founder’s need for capital from the date the regime happens to permit a sale.

A founder might be locked for one hundred and eighty days in New York, three hundred and sixty in London, or through a staged promoter lock-in in Mumbai. In each case the underlying position is the same: illiquid by rule, valuable, and needed.

The bridge lets the founder meet a present obligation or fund the next venture during the lock-up. They can then reach the release window with a genuine choice rather than a forced sale. The instrument does not shorten the clock; it removes the pressure the clock would otherwise create.

See Pre-IPO & Lock-Up Bridges for the use case, and What Founders Do With the Liquidity for what the released capital tends to fund.

The one constant is that the lock-up regime is an input to be read precisely, not a generic six-month assumption. The eligibility of a specific locked-up position, and the tenor and recourse profile that fit its release calendar, are established at the indicative-terms stage. The lock-up terms themselves are confirmed, in every case, against the holder’s own legal advice.

At a glance
Lock-Up Regimes Compared

US, Europe, and Asia-Pacific, side by side.

A comparison of post-IPO lock-up regimes across the United States, Europe, and Asia-Pacific, covering the source of the restriction, its typical length, whether the release is a single step or staggered, whether a pledge is usually caught, and the disclosure of a pledge.
Dimension United States Europe Asia-Pacific
Source of the lock-up A private contract with the underwriters; there is no statutory IPO lock-up. Contractual undertakings to the underwriters, disclosed in the prospectus under the EU Prospectus Regulation. Frequently mandatory by rule (HKEX Listing Rules and India’s SEBI ICDR Regulations among them), though some venues remain contractual.
Typical length Customarily around one hundred and eighty days from pricing. Commonly in the one hundred and eighty to three hundred and sixty-day range, often longer for founders than for financial investors. Varies by regime and can run longer for control holders; qualitatively extended rather than a single fixed norm.
Release pattern A single contractual cliff, typically one step. Often tiered: founders may remain locked while earlier investors come free. Frequently staggered across more than one date, as with a staged promoter release or a two-stage control lock-up.
Is a pledge usually caught? A lock-up typically restricts sales and transfers, not necessarily pledges; the drafting governs. Likewise a matter of the specific undertaking; a pledge may be permitted where a sale is not. Turns on the rule and the drafting; whether a pledge is caught, or requires consent, is confirmed case by case.
Disclosure of a pledge A pledge by a substantial holder is, in most cases, a disclosable event read against the calendar. Similarly disclosable; the release calendar is already a matter of public record from listing. Watched especially closely: mandatory-lock-up regimes such as Hong Kong and India scrutinise promoter and controlling-shareholder encumbrance.

A general comparison of lock-up regimes, indicative and illustrative only: not legal advice or a representation about any specific listing. Lock-up terms are always confirmed against the holder’s own counsel. See the disclosures.

Markets
Related Markets

Which markets does this apply to?

United States stock loans · United Kingdom stock loans · Euronext stock loans · Hong Kong stock loans · India stock loans

How the loan itself works is set out in the main guide: securities-based lending: how securities-backed loans work.

FAQ
Common Questions

IPO lock-up periods: frequently asked questions.

Q · 01

How long is an IPO lock-up period in the US, Europe, and Asia?

It varies by regime: a US lock-up customarily runs around 180 days, a European one commonly 180 to 360 days, and much of Asia-Pacific imposes mandatory lock-ups by rule. The US has no statutory lock-up and Europe no single statutory period: both rely on contracts with the underwriters, and European lock-ups are disclosed in the prospectus.

In Asia-Pacific, Hong Kong locks up controlling shareholders for at least six months under the HKEX Listing Rules. India imposes a staggered promoter lock-in under the SEBI ICDR Regulations. The bridge financing is timed against whichever window actually binds the specific holder.

Q · 02

Can a founder finance against shares that are still in a lock-up?

Often, yes: a lock-up typically restricts a sale, and a pledge is not a sale. Whether a specific lock-up permits a pledge as collateral, or requires underwriter consent, is a question of the drafting and the regime.

Where a pledge is permitted, a bridge loan can release liquidity during the lock-up that an outright sale could not. The tenor is set to run past the release window, so the holder is never forced to sell into it.

Q · 03

Why does the lock-up regime affect the timing of a bridge loan?

Because the release window defines both when a holder could sell and when a lender could realise the collateral. A bridge is structured to span the period from the point the founder needs capital to the point a chosen liquidity event becomes available. That event might be a lock-up expiry, a secondary, or a staged promoter release.

Where the regime staggers the release (as in India) or extends it for controlling holders (as in Hong Kong), the tenor and recourse profile follow the specific staged calendar. They are not set against a single date.

Confidential Enquiries

A specific position to discuss?

Submit a confidential enquiry. A senior principal will respond within one business day.